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Consider a situation when we need to transport water from
one place to another place in a leaky bucket. Some of the water would
always leak out. If all water leaked out, it is obvious that we would stop
our efforts to carry water. Our decision to carry the water or not will
depend on how leaky the bucket is and on how big is our need for water
at the destination. For instance, if bringing a little water to the other end
can save a life we will be perhaps willing to accept that, say, 99 % of the
water leaks out. This is an extreme situation. Societies, however, tacitly
judge how much leakage they are prepared to tolerate while making a
transfer to the needy.
Imagine a hypothetical society consisting of two people: one poor and
one rich with incomes $50 and $500. To have a grasp of welfare in this
society we might think of a function where total welfare increases
whenever the incomes of these two persons grow and whenever the
increase in income of one individual does not decrease the income of
the other. This is the famous Pareto optimality criterion. We may
introduce a second property to this function to state that any transfer of
income from the rich to the poor also increases social welfare. This is
called the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer. The basic idea behind this
principle is that the gain of $1 by the poor is more valuable than the loss
of $1 to the rich. Taken together, these criteria imply that any
redistribution of income from rich to poor will increase social welfare
provided that total income available to society does not decrease.
In accordance with the above principle, any redistributive policy that
reduces inequality without reducing the average income of the society
in question should be considered as good. If the redistribution of
income from rich to poor is welfare enhancing, why do governments not
always redistribute incomes from the rich to the poor, and reduce both
inequality and poverty? There are, of course, many reasons of political
economy why this is so. But there is also one catch in the welfare
function that it is useful to think about explicitly: the money must be
carried from the rich to the poor in a leaky bucket (Okun, 1975). There is
no costless transfer of money from the rich to the poor: some of the
money will always disappear in transit so the poor will not receive all
the money that is taken from the rich. The leakage basically represents
inefficiency. The issue is how much inefficiency a society is or should be
prepared to tolerate? The answer depends on how much importance
the society gives to reducing inequality.
Policies dealing with inequality and recommending income transfers are
usually framed within one of the two most widely used social welfare
functions or measures of income inequality. The Gini index is the one
most widely used measure of inequality. The social welfare function
implied by the Gini index is defined as mean income multiplied by one
minus the Gini index. The other most widely used is Atkinson’s social
welfare function, whose construction allows for different degrees of
inequality aversion expressed by the parameterε . The larger ε  is,
the greater is inequality aversion and, thus, the greater will be
tolerance of leakages.
To illustrate how these two types of social welfare functions interplay
with leakages and inequality, let us chose ε as equal to 1. Suppose we
transfer $25 (5% of the income of the rich) from the rich to the poor.
If the society can be better described by a Gini social welfare function,
then transfers will stop when the leakage is greater than 50%. At this
point the per cent change in social welfare becomes negative and total
welfare is reduced. If the society can better be modeled by Atkinson’s
welfare function, then waste can go up to 90% before the transfer is
regarded as undesirable. Thus, a society behaving along the lines of an
Atkinson welfare function with moderate aversion to inequality (ε = 1 )
is much more concerned with inequality than a society behaving
according to the Gini welfare function.
Impact of leak age on welfare
Leaks, in the more general sense of the term adopted here, can occur
due to several factors, including administrative cost corruption, reduced
or misplaced work effort, distorted saving and investment decisions,
possible changes in socioeconomic attitudes, and targeting errors.
All of these should be, and usually are, carefully weighed when
analysing the efficiency of redistributive policies. But the lesson here is
that the choice of inequality indicator itself, and thereby a social welfare
function, is not an inconsequential matter. Careful attention must be
given, which is not often the case, to the choice of indicators and the
analytical framework. Society’s concerns with inequality and poverty
should be properly addressed and reflected in policy evaluations.
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